Jared Goff thrived when under center and the Lions played to his strength

Lions QB Jared Goff was better under center than in the shotgun and Detroit’s offense played to that strength

Fans of a certain vintage might recall when quarterbacks were nearly always taking snaps under center. The shotgun formation was a novelty instead of the norm.

In today’s NFL, over 83 percent of all offensive snaps come with the quarterback in some form of shotgun formation. Some quarterbacks, notably Jalen Hurts and Joe Burrow, take over 95 percent of their snaps in the shotgun.

That’s not what Jared Goff does. The Lions quarterback is comfortable working under center, and the offensive scheme plays to Goff’s ability. Goff was one of just two NFL quarterbacks who was not in the shotgun on at least 75 percent of snaps in 2023.

Goff and the Lions operated in the gun just 74.1 percent of the time. Only Minnesota’s Kirk Cousins, a similar type of pocket/play-action passer, was under center for a higher percentage than Goff.

Goff was statistically better when under center than in the gun, too. While there was little difference in the completion percentage, Goff averaged 2.0 yards per attempt (9.0 to 7.0) and over 2.6 more air yards per attempt from under center (9.58 to 6.97). He also had a lower sack rate (8 percent to 5.5) and lower INT rate (1.9 percent to 3.3 percent) when under center.

Not every offense can operate with such a high frequency of playing under center, and not every quarterback is comfortable doing it, either. Goff’s percentage of snaps under center rather than in the shotgun has increased in each of his three seasons in Detroit, a sign that coordinator Ben Johnson and coach Dan Campbell are further tailoring the offense to fit what Goff does well.

All data is from SIS and Pro Football Reference

No team used shotgun formations less than the Lions in 2022

Jared Goff took more snaps under center than any other QB, a function of Detroit’s offense catering to his skills

[anyclip pubname=”2103″ widgetname=”0016M00002U0B1kQAF_M8036″]

The modern NFL offense heavily utilizes the shotgun formation as the base offensive set. Well, most offenses do. Not the 2022 Detroit Lions.

Detroit operated out of the shotgun on just 51 percent of its snaps last season. That’s the lowest percentage in the league. Quarterback Jared Goff took 49 percent of his snaps under center.

The tailoring of the offensive set to Goff’s preference to work under center worked quite well. Detroit’s offense ranked third out of 32 teams in EPA (expected points added per play) when not in the gun. Goff was good from the gun, too; the Lions were 7th in EPA from the shotgun.

One other wrinkle that stands out is the use of pre-snap motion. The Lions used it 53 percent of the time, the 6th-most motion in the league.

All statistical data was compiled by Sports Info Solutions.

[lawrence-related id=93029]

Is Kirk Cousins being used in the shotgun too much?

The Vikings are using shotgun more than they have since 2018 with John DeFillipo as the offensive coordinator. Is that the best idea with Kirk Cousins?

The Minnesota Vikings offense has looked quite a bit different this season. While head coach Kevin O’Connell runs a version of the wide zone system that the Vikings have used over the last few years,

O’Connell runs the Sean McVay version of the offense, which focuses more on running 11 personnel and incorporating more modern concepts like jet motion and prioritizing the shotgun.

That last element has proven to be interesting for the Vikings. Starting quarterback Kirk Cousins played well in the Shanahan/Kubiak wide zone and transitioning him to the McVay version was always going to be interesting.

One of those reasons is the fact that a lot of their plays are run from the shotgun. It isn’t a set where he has had a lot of success in a Vikings uniform.

Per Sports Info Solutions, we have Cousins splits when running the offense out of the shotgun.

  • 2018: 522 dropbacks, 326/475 3,250 yards, 22 touchdowns, 9 interceptions
  • 2019: 243 dropbacks, 143/223 1,776 yards, 9 touchdowns, 3 interceptions
  • 2020: 297 dropbacks, 182/266 2,078 yards, 15 touchdowns, 9 interceptions
  • 2021: 369 dropbacks, 217/344 2,453 yards, 18 touchdowns, 4 interceptions
  • 2022: 145 dropbacks,  90/137 901 yards, 4 touchdowns, 4 interceptions

If you project out what Cousins would have based on his start, it would look like this.

  • 411 dropbacks 255/388 2,553 yards 11 touchdowns, 11 interceptions

Cousins isn’t necessarily bad in the shotgun but it’s hard to call him good in that regard.  His 2018 season with John DeFillipo was the season with the highest time in the shotgun and that didn’t work for a myriad of reasons. The splits between shotgun and under center in his Vikings career are staggering.

  • Shotgun: 1,576 dropbacks, 958/1,445 for 10,458, 68 touchdowns, 29 interceptions
  • Under center: 969 dropbacks, 646/910 for 7,431 yards, 65 touchdowns, 12 interceptions

There are some circumstances built in here like garbage time and trying to come from behind a lot (especially reflective in 2020). The numbers really bare out how much more effective and smarter with the football Cousins is under center.

Some of that is just comfortability. Cousins thrives with play-action and plays with boot-action and that is mostly taken out of the equation when you run plays out of the shotgun.

How will the offense continue to evolve with O’Connell after the bye week? That remains to be seen, but utilizing Cousins under center more might be the way to help unlock it.

[mm-video type=playlist id=01eqbyjpbajmjvnqmj player_id=none image=https://vikingswire.usatoday.com/wp-content/plugins/mm-video/images/playlist-icon.png]

Cowboys lost offensive balance as Patriots game progressed

The Cowboys offense was balanced in terms of their formations and run/pass distribution, but the they still couldn’t score enough points.

The Dallas Cowboys lost a disheartening contest to a New England Patriots team that hasn’t lost at home in years. The Cowboys fell to 6-5, but they still remain one game ahead of the Philadelphia Eagles in the NFC East.

Dallas played from behind for most of the game and the offense didn’t score a single touchdown, but Dallas offensive coordinator Kellen Moore still managed to call a balanced game.

The Context

This weekly look at the play calling began as a simple question: would the new “offensive mind” hired by Cowboys owner Jerry Jones be less predictable than the previous coordinator, Scott Linehan.

Linehan was predictable in the most basic of ways. He called running plays more than 80% of the time that quarterback Dak Prescott took the snap from under center, and he called passing plays on more than 80% of the snaps that Prescott was in the shotgun.

This is an ongoing attempt to assess whether Moore is less predictable than Linehan in terms of the above mentioned concepts.

You can read the stats and analysis from previous games here.

The Raw Data from Week 12 versus the New England Patriots

Dallas ran 62 offensive plays against the Patriots. Cowboys quarterback Dak Prescott took 24 snaps from under center and 38 in the shotgun.

Against New England in Week 12, Moore called 24 running plays, 28 pass attempts, and 10 passes off play-action.

First half snaps from under center

Dallas ran 35 plays in the first half. Prescott was under center for 16 of those 35 plays.

Of the 16 snaps from under center in the first half:

  • 10 were runs
  • two were pass attempts after a straight drop back
  • four were pass attempts off play-action

First half snaps from shotgun:

Prescott was in the shotgun for 19 plays in the first half.

Of the 19 snaps from the shotgun:

  • six were runs
  • 10 were passes
  • three were pass attempts off play-action

A few things stand out about the first half.

Despite the success Prescott has had throwing the ball from the shotgun in previous weeks, Moore went back to a more traditional notion of balance in the first half: Prescott took 45.6% of the snaps from under center.

For Cowboys fans, it was a rare half of football in at least one way: Moore achieved a genuine balance in formation (16 under center and 19 from the shotgun) and run/pass distribution (16 runs, 12 passes, and seven pass attempts off play-action), but the offense was not effective at scoring points (a mere six in the half).

Moore is back to calling a lot of passes off play-action. In the first half, seven of the 19 pass attempts came off play-action (36%).

Snaps from under center in the second half

Dallas ran 27 offensive plays in the second half.

Prescott was under center for eight of those snaps.

Of the eights snaps taken from under center:

  • six were runs
  • two were pass attempts off play-action

Snaps from the shotgun in the second half

Of the 19 snaps taken in the shotgun in the second half:

  • two were runs
  • 16 were pass attempts
  • one was a pass attempt off play-action

Dallas was not as balanced in the second half in terms of the formation (eight snaps under center and 19 in the shotgun) or the run/pass distribution (eight runs, 16 passes, and three pass attempts of play-action).

As is often the case in the second half, the rushing attempts go down, the shotgun snaps and pass attempts go up.

They went from seven play-action passes on 35 plays in the first half (20%), to just three attempts on 27 second-half plays (11.1%).

The one explosive play by the Cowboys offense was the 59-yard catch-and-run reception by wide receiver Randall Cobb. That play came off play-action on a second-down play when Prescott was under center.

Totals for the game

Moore called 62 offensive plays in Week 12. The only time the Cowboys have run fewer offensive plays once this year was the 57 they ran against New Orleans Saints in Week 4.

Moore called 24 runnings plays:

  • 16 when the quarterback took the snap from under center
  • eight when the quarterback was in the shotgun

Moore called 38 pass attempts:

  • two after the quarterback dropped back from under center
  • six off play-action from under center
  • 26 from the shotgun
  • four off play-action form the shotgun

Conclusions:

  1. Moore’s unit only scored nine points in Week 12. No one wins many football games without scoring a touchdown.

The thing that stands out the most is the difference in the play-calling in the second half. Moore called for the shotgun on 70% of the snaps in the second half (19 of 27 or 70%) compared to just 54% in the first-half (19 of 35).

Moore also called more passing plays in the second half: 19 passes to eight runs (passing on 70.3% of the plays). In the first half, it was 16 runs and 19 pass attempts (passing on 54% of the plays).

This is the startling thing: even with all the shotgun formation and extra passing in the second half, the Cowboys actually gained more yards, earned more first downs, and scored more points in the first half.

2. Unfortunately, this was yet another game with no designed runs for Prescott. Given the success Prescott has had running the ball this season, it is disappointing that Moore has not scripted a few runs for Prescott in every game.

To my knowledge, no one has asked Moore to explain why there are not more designed runs for his quarterback. Someone should.

3. On a potentially more positive note: Moore did avoid the predictability that was so common under former offensive coordinator Scott Linehan – at least when Prescott was under center. He called runs on just 66.6% of the snaps Prescott took from under center (16 of 24).

When it came to calls from the shotgun, Moore was close to Linehan’s run/pass ratio: he called passes on 78.9% of the shotgun plays (30 of 38).

Moore, for much of 2019, has been able to evade Linehan-like predictability when the quarterback is under center. He rarely has a problem finding a way to pass more than 20% of the under-center snaps.

However, the Cowboys’ run/pass ratio is much more like Linehan when Prescott is in the shotgun; Moore has struggled to consistently call running plays on more than 20% of the shotgun snaps.

Is throwing so much from the shotgun a part of Moore’s general philosophy,  or is it more indicative of the Cowboys being forced to throw the ball from the shotgun because they have been losing games?

4. Definitely more positive: Moore is back to calling a lot of play-action passes. After using play-action frequently in the first three games, Dallas got away from using it for a few weeks.

More than a 25% of Prescott’s pass attempts against New England came off play-action (10 of 38).

Moore has called 10 or more play-action passes in the last five games.

Miscellaneous Observations

  • Since 2018, the Cowboys are 9-1 against the NFC East and 7-10 against the rest of the NFL. Of those seven victories, only one has come against a team with a winning record (the Saints last year). The total is two if you include the Seahawks in the playoffs.
  • Has Jason Witten ever dropped two passes in one game before?
  • The Patriots were 3-14 on third-down conversions (21.4%). Opponents have converted just 43 of their 137 third-down attempts (31.3%).  Dallas is third in the NFL for third-down defense (behind the Patriots and the San Francisco 49ers).
  • The Cowboys were terrible converting their own third downs; they converted just twice on 13 attempts. They are now 65-134 for the season, which drops them below 50%, and makes them the second best offense in the NFL at converting third downs (behind the Baltimore Ravens).
  • The disappearance of wide receiver Amari Cooper was impossible to miss if you watched the game and heard the commentators.The post about his split-stats for road games compared to home games is a must-read.

The Cowboys don’t have much time to wallow in the loss to New England, for they must prepare to face the Buffalo Bills and their stingy defense on Thanksgiving Day.

You can follow on Twitter here.

[vertical-gallery id=635321][vertical-gallery id=635041][vertical-gallery id=634743][lawrence-newsletter]

Kellen Moore challenges dogma that Cowboys offense must run through Elliott

Kellen Moore is changing the “winning formula” in Dallas. He proved the Cowboys offense doesn’t need “to get Zeke going” to be effective.

The Dallas Cowboys struggled to defeat the 3-5-1 Detroit Lions in Week 11, but the victory improved their record to 6-4 to maintain first place in the NFC ahead of the 5-5 Philadelphia Eagles.

This is one of the few games this year that was actually a close game for all four quarters. The play-calling of Cowboys offensive coordinator Kellen Moore does not bear a striking resemblance to any of the previous games he has called. One has to be careful not to read too much into one game, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that the play-calling against the Lions might be the game in which Moore finally found his own version of a “balanced offense”.

It is quite possible Moore’s pass-heavy attack against Detroit was simply a reaction to defense stacking the line to stop running back Ezekiel Elliot; however, it is also possible Moore has accepted the reality that the Cowboys are at their best when Dak Prescott has the ball in his hands.

Could Moore finally be moving past the long and dearly held belief that the Cowboys offense needs, “to get Zeke going” to be effective?

You can read the stats and analysis from previous games here.

The Context

Dallas ran 69 offensive plays against the Lions. Prescott took 22 snaps from under center and 47 in the shotgun. This kind of disparity between snaps under center versus the shotgun is typical of the games the Cowboys have lost.

The only game Dallas won in which Prescott operated from the shotgun so frequently was against the Giants in Week 9 (26 from under center and 43 in shotgun).

In the first four victories, Dallas was balanced in terms of where Prescott lined up: 32-34 against the Giants, 32-36 in Washington, 32-39 versus the Dolphins, and 34-36 against the Eagles.

But the three games they lost saw a major shift to the shotgun: 18-39 in New Orleans, 21-52 against the Packers, 26-56 versus the Jets, and 20-51 against Minnesota.

The Saints game was a bit of an anomaly because they were never behind more than six points but still went heavy on the shotgun (18 snaps under center and 39 from shotgun) and they passed far more often then they attempted to run.

Raw Data from Week 11

Where these numbers differ from the official stat line, it is because offensive plays that were negated for penalties were intentionally included.

In Week 11 against the Detroit Lions, Moore called 18 runs, 35 passing plays, 16 play-action passes, and one rushing attempt off play-action.

First-half snaps under center

Dallas ran 40 plays in the first half. Prescott was under center for 9 snaps and in the shotgun for 31.

Of those 9 snaps from under center:

  • six were rushes
  • three were play-action passes

First-half shotgun snaps

Of the 31 shotgun snaps:

  • six were rushes
  • 20 were passes
  • four were play-action passes
  • one was a play-action run

Dallas was not balanced in the first half in terms of formation (nine snaps from under center and 31 in shotgun) or the run/pass distribution, for they passed 67.5% of the time (12 runs, 20 passes, seven play-action passes and one play-action run).

A few more things stand out.

First, like the week before against the Vikings, Moore is back to using play-action on a regular basis. A full 20% of the first-half plays were based on play-action, and 26% of the passes came off play-action.

Second, unlike some of the previous games, Dallas only attempted one play-action run: it was a designed run for Prescott. The Cowboys seem to have gotten away from calling running plays for Prescott in recent weeks. It is a bit surprising that no one has asked Moore or head coach Jason Garrett to explain this change.

Third, the Cowboys scored 21 points in the second quarter. They only ran the ball from under center twice in the second quarter.

Snaps from the under center in the second half

Dallas ran 29 plays in the second half. Prescott was under center for 13 snaps and in the shotgun for 16.

Of the 13 snaps that Prescott took under center:

  • six were runs
  • seven were play-action passes

Second-half shotgun snaps

Of the 16 plays from the shotgun:

  • 14 were pass attempts
  • two were play-action passes

The Cowboys’ offense was much more balanced in the second half in terms of formation (13 snaps from under center and 16 from the shotgun), but they were not very balanced in terms of the run/pass distribution (six runs, 14 passes, and nine play-action passes). Despite having success with it in previous games, Moore called no rushing attempts off play-action.

It is noteworthy that Dallas did not run the ball from the shotgun at all in the second half.

Totals for game

Dallas ran 69 plays on offense.

Moore called 19 rushing plays:

  • 12 from under center
  • six from from the shotgun
  • one of play-action from the shotgun

Moore called 50 passes:

  • ten off play-action from under center
  • 34 from the shotgun
  • six passes off play-action from the shotgun

Conclusions

The things that sticks out most is the 16 play-action passes. Despite Prescott being crowned “Captain Play-Action” after the first three games this year, Moore really got away from calling play-action passes in Weeks 4-7.

In the last two weeks, Prescott has attempted more passes off play-action (16) in both games than in any of the previous games. The Cowboys attempted 50 passes; 32% of those passes came off pay-action. Almost a quarter (24.6%) of all the Cowboys plays involved some kind of play-action.

I have long held the conviction that being balanced is a prerequisite to offensive success in the NFL. Being balanced no longer means striving to run the ball 50% of the time.

It seems as though Moore may be in the process of redefining what it means to be a “balanced offense”.

I have argued that balance for the Cowboys should be predicated on three things: the traditional run/pass ration (preferably closer to 60% passing than 70%), the frequency with which they run the ball when Prescott is under center (preferably less than 75% compared to the more than 80% of Linehan) and the regularity with which they pass when Prescott is in the shotgun (preferably less than 75% compared to the more than 80% of Linehan).

Against Detroit, Moore called for a pass attempt on 72.4% of their plays.

Moore did keep the run/pass ratio balanced when Prescott was under center; he called running plays on just 54.5% of those plays (12 runs on 22 snaps), which is a drastic improvement from former offensive coordinator Scott Linehan who called runs on more than 80% of the under-center snaps.

However, Moore was Linehan-esque when calling passing plays from the shotgun; he called for a pass attempt on 40 of the 47 shotgun snaps. That is 85%, which is very similar to Linehan’s offense.

If Moore can string together a few victories over winning teams with this offensive approach to run/pass distribution and throwing so much from the shotgun, I look forward to admitting that my notions of a balanced being integral to offensive success are antiquated.

Miscellaneous Observations

  • When was last time that Cowboys’ fans were so disappointed and worried after a win? Giving up 27 points to the Lions without their starting quarterback is troubling.
  • Even more troubling is the success Detroit had running the ball with a player who wasn’t good enough to even make a game day roster until the Lions squad suffered multiple injuries.
  • The inability to stop the run could very well be the Dallas Cowboys Achilles’ heel.
  • Since 2018, Dallas is 9-1 against teams in the NFC East and just 7-9 against the rest of the NFL. Six of those victories came against teams with losing records (Lions were 6-10, Jaguars were 5-11, Falcons were 7-9, Buccaneers were 5-11, Dolphins are 2-7, and now the Lions who were 3-5-1). Other than the Eagles, their only victories against teams with winning records were the Saints last year and the Seahawks in the playoffs.
  • The Lions were 6 of 13 on third-down conversions (46%). Opposing offenses are converting third downs just 32.5% of the time against the Cowboys defense (40-123). Dallas owns the third best third-down defense in the league (after New England and San Francisco).
  • Dallas was an impressive 8-14 on their own third-down attempts (57%). They are now 63-121 on the season (52%). That makes them the best in the NFL at converting third downs.
  • Offensive yards per game is a misleading statistic. However, the stats of the Dallas offense continue to look elite. They are second, after Baltimore, in yards per drive (42.21). They are tied for second with Kansas City, also behind the Ravens, in points per drive (2.65). They are second, again behind Lamar Jackson’s team, in touchdowns per drive (.315).
  • Dallas was 3-5 in the red zone against the Lions. Their red zone efficiency for the year is 58.33, which puts them 17th in the NFL, but still much better than they were doing under Linehan.

The Cowboys have their biggest test of the season next week when they travel to New England to face the Patriots.

You can follow on Twitter @CJosephWright.

[vertical-gallery id=634702][vertical-gallery id=634451][vertical-gallery id=633628][lawrence-newsletter]

Moore’s play-calling resembles Linehan, are Cowboys avoiding Dak runs?

The Cowboys were balanced in the first half in formations and run/pass distribution, but the offense became one dimensional in second half.

In Week 10, the Dallas Cowboys took another step backward; they fell to 5-4 by losing a close contest to the Minnesota Vikings.

Unlike the previous two games, Cowboys offensive coordinator Kellen Moore was unable, or unwilling, to call a balanced game.

You can read the stats and analysis from previous games here.

Raw Data from Week 10

Where these numbers differ from the official stat line, it is because offensive plays that were negated for penalties were intentionally included.

Dallas ran 71 offensive plays against the Giants. Cowboys quarterback Dak Prescott took 20 snaps from under center and 51 in the shotgun, a ratio that is consistent with the games they have lost. The only game that Dallas won in which Prescott was Prescott operated from the shotgun so frequently was against the Giants in Week 9 (26 from under center and 43 in shotgun).

In the first four victories, Dallas was balanced in terms of where Prescott lined up: 32-34 against the Giants, 32-36 in Washington, 32-39 versus the Dolphins, and 34-36 against the Eagles.

But the three games they lost saw a major shift to the shotgun: 18-39 in New Orleans, 21-52 against the Packers, and 26-56 versus the Jets.

The Saints game was a bit of an anomaly because they were never behind more than six points but still went heavy on the shotgun (18 snaps under center and 39 from shotgun) and they passed far more often then they attempted to run.

In Week 10 against the Minnesota Vikings, Moore called 20 runs, 35 passing plays, 15 play-action passes, and one rushing attempt off play-action.

First-half snaps under center

Dallas ran 36 plays in the first half. Prescott was under center for 17 snaps and in the shotgun for 19.

Of those 17 snaps from under center:

  • nine were rushes
  • one was a straight drop-back pass
  • six were play-action passes
  • one was run off play-action

First-half shotgun snaps

Of the 19 shotgun snaps:

  • three were rushes
  • 15 were passes
  • one was a play-action pass

Dallas was balanced in the first half in terms of formation (17 snaps from under center and 19 in shotgun) and the run/pass distribution (12 runs, 16 passes, and seven play-action passes and one play-action run).

A few more things stand out.

First, Moore is back to using play-action on a regular basis. Almost 20% of the first-half plays were play-action passes and 44% of the passes came off play-action. If you include the play-action run, then 22% of all first-half plays utilized play-action.

Second, unlike some of the previous games, Dallas only attempted one play-action run: it was a handoff to wide receiver Tavon Austin. The Cowboys seem to have gotten away from calling running plays for Prescott in recent weeks. One has to wonder if all the big hits Prescott’s takes in the pocket have caused Moore and company to be more reluctant to design intentional running plays for their quarterback.

Third, despite all the condemnation from the fans that Moore stubbornly sent running back Ezekiel Elliot in to a “brick wall” repeatedly, the Cowboys were not unsuccessful running the ball in the first half. Elliot had 37 yards on 12 carries, which is more than 3 yards a rush. That is far from spectacular, but it isn’t horrendous either.

Fourth, when criticizing Moore’s play calling, many people seemed to forget how the first two offensive drives ended. Both drives saw consecutive incomplete passes on second and six, and then again on third and six. That is two drives than ended when they couldn’t gain six yards on two pass attempts.

Snaps from the under center in the second half

Dallas ran 35 plays in the second half. Prescott was under center for three snaps and in the shotgun for 32.

Of the three snaps that Prescott took under center:

  • two runs
  • one play-action pass

Second-half shotgun snaps

Of the 32 plays from the shotgun:

  • six were runs
  • 19 were pass attempts
  • seven were play-action passes

The Cowboys’ offense lacked any semblance of balance in the second half in terms of formation (3 snaps from under center and 32 from the shotgun) or run/pass distribution (eight runs, 19 passes, and eight play-action passes). As mentioned above, despite having success with it in previous games, Moore called no rushing attempts off play-action.

This column rarely professes to have answers, but it does posit questions. In the second half, the Cowboys ran the ball eight times and threw it 27 times.

Could they have passed more and not have become completely one dimensional?

Are the Cowboys good enough to throw the ball effectively if they become one dimensional and the defense knows they are going to throw?

Totals for game

Dallas ran 71 plays on offense.

Moore called 21 rushing plays:

  • 11 from under center
  • nine from from the shotgun
  • one of play-action from under center

Moore called 50 passes:

  • one from under center
  • seven off play-action from under center
  • 34 from the shotgun
  • eight passes off play-action from the shotgun

Conclusions

Calling a balanced game for the Cowboys is a bit different than some other NFL teams. It is not as simple as looking at the run/pass ratio. That is definitely part of it, and I would argue that Dallas should be much closer to 60% passing than 70%. But that is only part of the equation because of the infrequency with which Dak Prescott takes a snap from under center and attempts a pass.

This season, Prescott has sometimes thrown three, and on fewer occasions four, passes a game after taking the snap from under center, but he averages less than 2.5 drop-back passes a game. Moreover, there is a tendency for some of these throws to be quick screen-type plays to the wide receiver. In previous years, it was unusual for Dak to attempt more than two passes a game after starting under center. Against the Vikings, Prescott threw just one pass after taking the snap from under center.

Given these “limitations”, being balanced for the Cowboys means not running too frequently when Prescott is under center and not throwing every time he is in the shotgun.

Prescott has officially attempted 319 passes in 2019. However, if you include, as this analysis does, plays called back for penalties, scrambles of designed passes, and sacks, then Moore has called 352 passing plays. Of those 352 passing plays, Prescott has dropped back from center and attempted to throw the ball a mere 22 times. That means that 6.25% of Moore’s calls for a pass attempt have been based on Prescott taking the snap under center.

In other words, 93.7% of Moore’s pass calls have been from the shotgun or off play-action. From a different angle: of the 352 passing plays that Moore has called in 2019, 297 of them have come out of the shotgun (84.3%).

Last week, this column lauded Moore and his play calling for finally getting away from the predictable trends that were a mainstay under former offensive coordinator Scott Linehan. He was infamous for calling runs on more than 80% of the plays that Prescott took the snap from under center and calling passes on more than 80% of the plays that Prescott started in the shotgun.

You can click here to get the stats on how Moore’s numbers compare to Linehan for each of the first eight games. (It is near the end of the post.)

In Week 9 against the Giants, Dallas ran the ball on 15 of 26 snaps when Prescott was under center (57.6%); they attempted a pass on 67% of the plays that Prescott was in the shotgun (29 of 43). That is fantastic balance because it makes it impossible for the defense to know whether they are likely to pass or run based solely on the formation.

This week, Dallas ran the ball on 12 of the 20 plays that started with Prescott under center (60%). That is good balance. But, they attempted a pass on 42 of the 51 shotgun snaps (82.3%). That percentage is more like Scott Linehan, and it comes dangerously close to being predictable.

Miscellaneous Observations

  • The Vikings drive in the 3rd quarter that featured 10 straight runs (including the two-point conversion) was a genuine game changer.
  • It seemed like the Vikings ran similar type screens over and over again for big gains. Genuine question: is the failure to adjust to this play after seeing it at least 4 times also on Jason Garrett, or is the players or the defensive coaches?
  • Since 2018, Dallas is 9-1 against teams in the NFC East and just 6-9 against the rest of the NFL. Five of those victories came against teams with losing records (Lions were 6-10, Jaguars were 5-11, Falcons were 7-9, Buccaneers were 5-11, and the Dolphins are 2-7). Other than the Eagles, their only victories against teams with winning records were the Saints last year and the Seahawks in the playoffs.
  • The Vikings were 8 of 14 on third-down conversions (57%). Opposing offenses are converting third downs just 30.91% of the time against the Cowboys defense (34-110). Dallas owns the third best third-down defense in the league (after New England and San Francisco).
  • Dallas was an impressive 9-15 on their own third-down attempts (60%). They are now 55-107 on the season (51%). That makes them the best in the NFL at converting third downs.
  • The Cowboys were 0-2 on fourth-down attempts. On the season, Dallas ranks 30th in the league on fourth down; they convert just 20% of those attempts.

The games don’t get much easier for the Cowboys in the coming weeks: they face the Detroit Lions this week before squaring off against two tough AFC opponents in the Patriots and Bills.

You can follow on Twitter @CJosephWright.