When you’re a great strategist, and another great strategist ruins your life, you can respond in one of two ways: You can get mad, or you can get even. In 2018, the Chicago Bears handed Rams head coach Sean McVay one of the most embarrassing losses of his NFL career, and one of the primary instigators was Brandon Staley, the outside linebackers coach working under defensive coordinator Vic Fangio.
McVay’s offense had been the talk of the NFL through the first 13 weeks of the 2018 season, but then, the Rams ran into an absolute buzzsaw in the Bears. In a 15-6 loss, Chicago prevented a McVay team from scoring a touchdown — per ESPN’s Stats & Info, it was only the second time in McVay’s 79 games as a head coach or offensive coordaintor that this had happened. Of course, the Patriots prevented a touchdown in their 13-3 win over the Rams in Super Bowl LIII at the end of the season, but the Fangio/Staley combination made things even worse for then-third-year quarterback Jared Goff.
The All-22: How the Bears stopped the Rams–and struck a blow for defense
Chicago’s defense turned Goff from one of the more promising young quarterbacks in the game into the uncomfortable, jittery rookie he was in 2016. Goff finished his night with 20 completions in 44 attempts for 180 yards, no touchdowns, and four interceptions—the worst game of his career, and that includes the series of disasters he underwent under former head coach Jeff Fisher and offensive coordinator Rob Boras in his inaugural campaign.
“I feel sick about it,” McVay said after the game. “Our job from an offensive standpoint, specifically as my role as a play caller, is to help our team move the football and score points and I felt like our defense played a good enough game, got enough takeaways to where they played winning football tonight.”
From the start, the Bears were going to bring pressure to Goff as often as possible. Per Pro Football Focus’ metrics, Goff was pressured on half of his 44 dropbacks, and the Bears blitzed on just nine of those dropbacks. When you can get pressure with your four down linemen and drop your back seven into coverage, you are going to turn most any quarterback into a jumpy thrower who will tend to make mistakes when he’s not throwing the ball away.
The Rams’ first third down of the game came with 9:21 left in the first quarter, and edge-rusher Khalil Mack (No. 52) was bound and determined to wreck this attempt all by himself, at the expense of right tackle Rob Havenstein (No. 79), who has no way to keep up with Mack’s inside move—a fake that would make a receiver proud. Goff may have been trying to get the ball in the vicinity of tight end Gerald Everett (No. 81), but he had to throw a bail pass out of bounds. The Rams had started on the Chicago 15 due to a Marcus Peters interception and 48-yard return, but they had to settle for a field goal.
Goff wasn’t pressured on his first of four interceptions, but he was unable to get the ball anywhere near receiver Robert Woods (No. 17). This may have been due to the weather, but the result was all about rookie linebacker Roquan Smith (No. 58) dropping into coverage well enough that even if Goff would have been able to put more velocity on the ball, this would have been a very tough completion.
And though Goff was debited for a career-high four picks, it could have been far worse. On two straight completions in the second quarter drive that followed his first interception, Goff targeted receiver Brandin Cooks twice as Cooks was covered by cornerback Prince Amukamara (No. 20), and in both cases, Amukamara dropped what would have been easy picks. On the second near-interception, Roquan Smith got into the action and nearly intercepted the ball Amukamara didn’t.
And so, you may ask, if Goff was having so much trouble, why didn’t the Rams hand the ball off to running back Todd Gurley more often? After all, it was a close game thanks to Trubisky’s equivalent inefficiency, so perhaps Sean McVay could have upended this ferocious defense with a ground game.
The Bears’ answer to that was to limit Gurley to 28 yards on 11 carries. A key element of Chicago’s defensive dominance is that they didn’t fall for the sweep movement that forces misdirection with other defenses–they stayed in their gaps with the confidence that comes from knowing you have the players to stop any back, no matter how good he may be. Here, defensive tackle Akiem Hicks (No. 96) and end Roy Robertson-Harris (No. 95) slice through the Rams’ offensive line, with Robertson-Harris and Roquan Smith (there’s that name again) demolishing Gurley with a suplex.
The Bears made life even more miserable for Gurley at the start of the second half. On Los Angeles’ first offensive play of the final 30 minutes, you can see Mack, Smith, and linebacker Leonard Floyd (No. 94) flowing to the ball and ignoring the motion of receiver Josh Reynolds.
And on the play after that, things got even worse for McVay’s usually explosive offense as nose tackle Eddie Goldman (No. 91) bull-rushes veteran center John Sullivan (No. 65) back into the pocket, sacking Goff for the safey.
Some argued that Goff was negatively affected by the cold weather, but he made it far more difficult on himself that it had to be by frequently telegraphing his intentions. Against a defense this good, you’re going to be lost if you stare down your target, as Goff did to Reynolds here. Cornerback Kyle Fuller was able to easily jump the route, because he knew exactly where the ball was going.
To demolish an offense this good in an era that favors nothing but offense makes what the Bears did an anomaly for the rest of the league, but more of the same (only better) for these new Monsters of the Midway.
McVay may have been mad, but he also got his first good look at Staley’s defensive ideas — which he wouldn’t forget. Soon after, it was time to get even with the rest of the league.