Coming into the 2021 offseason, the San Francisco 49ers had a crucial, franchise-defining decision to make: Would they hold on to quarterback Jimmy Garoppolo, who they signed to a five-year, $137.5 million contract in 2018 after trading their 2018 second-round pick to the Patriots in October 2017 to acquire him in the first place. Over four seasons with the 49ers, he’s played in just 31 of a possible 64 regular-season games, and he’s generally been average to below-average when on the field. The 2021 kicker for that contract had Garoppolo costing the team $26.4 million in cap space if he remained with the team, and a dead cap hit of just $2.8 million if he was released. Garoppolo’s contract also has a no-trade clause for the 2021 season, so even if any other team was interested in that double albatross of imposing cap expense and uninspiring performance, it was less likely to happen.
I wondered aloud why the 49ers hadn’t just released Garoppolo as the new league year began in order to avail themselves of more free-agent talent, and the only answer I could come up with was, “Well, maybe they still believe that Garoppolo is their guy.” 49ers head coach Kyle Shanahan, who I believe to be the best offensive play-designer in the game, has forgotten far more about football than I’ll ever know, so I was willing to listen to that particular reason.
Then, Friday happened, and everything went right out the window. When the 49ers traded their 2021 12th overall pick, a 2021 third-round pick, and first-round picks in 2022 and 2023 to the Dolphins for the right to move up nine spots to the third overall pick this year, it indicated that for Shanahan and general manager John Lynch, everything possible was in play.
Well, maybe not Trevor Lawrence, but pretty much everything else. Unless the 49ers are completely besotted with LSU receiver Ja’Marr Chase, or Oregon offensive tackle Penei Sewell, or some other non-quarterback they don’t think will be there at 12 and they just have to have, this is a very bold move to get the team’s next franchise quarterback, and it’s clear that after four seasons, Shanahan is convinced that Garoppolo isn’t going to be that guy. Perhaps Garoppolo sticks around for another season to help the next quarterback develop, but that’s an awful lot of money for an ad hoc quarterback coach in shoulder pads. Now, San Francisco waits to see what Garoppolo might net in a trade, or they can cut loose altogether, depending on how the new guy fits what Shanahan prefers to do.
So, what are the tentpole tenets of the Shanahan offense? Traditionally, he has wanted his quarterbacks to be on the move, and effective in doing so. Whether it’s bootleg throws with or without play-action, or second-reaction throws in which his quarterback is able to make plays even after things break down, that’s a crucial part of things. The 49ers under Shanahan are also tremendous proponents of pre-snap motion. They led the league in their Super Bowl season of 2019 with pre-snap motion on 66% of their passes. Last year, with the unimpressive triumvirate of Garoppolo, Nick Mullens, and C.J. Beathard, Shanahan upped the ante in 2020 with a league-high 73% of plays that included pre-snap motion.
Not only does motion create a clearer coverage picture for a quarterback — if a defender follows a receiver in motion, it’s man coverage; if not, it’s generally zone — but it also eliminates key defenders from the play. Shanahan put up a brilliant example of this in Week 17 of the 2019 season against the Seahawks on a 49-yard pass from Garoppolo to tight end George Kittle.
Garoppolo was able to spot a weakness in Seattle’s defense that he could exploit — Juszczyk covered by linebacker Mychal Kendricks, who was preoccupied to a point by Kittle’s presence aligned to the right side of the formation. Because of that preoccupation, Juszczyk had a free release to head upfield, and though he certainly wasn’t going to challenge Tyreek Hill in any footraces, he was able to run free against a defense that had been forced to react late as a result of Shanahan’s ability to design and implement motion and displacement concepts to the detriment of every defense he faces. Kendricks followed Juszczyk outside, but it looks as if the intention was for Kendricks to cover the flat, while the 49ers extended Juszczyk downfield. Kittle motioning back to the left side also took linebacker Bobby Wagner out of the picture — as a hook/curl defender, he had nothing to defend. Whenever you can remove your opponent’s best defensive player from the equation, you have an obvious advantage.
Play-action by itself is also a key part of how Shanahan beats defense. Last season, even with a quarterback group that was a flaming ball of “meh,” the 49ers completed 115 of 163 play-action passes from the pocket for 1,151 yards, 400 yards after the catch, eight touchdowns, and three interceptions. Without play-action from the pocket? 244 completions of 373 attempts for 2,745 yards, 1,333 yards after the catch, 12 touchdowns, and 14 picks. Enough said.
Nobody in the NFL makes things clearer, easier, and more potentially explosive for his quarterbacks than Shanahan, and it’s time to give Shanahan a quarterback who will match that playbook brilliance with his own on-field abilities. Here’s how well the top quarterbacks in the 2021 draft class would align with Shanahan’s preferences.