For two years, Sean McVay was one of the toughest coaches to figure out. His offense was dynamic and difficult to stop, helping elevate the play of everyone from Todd Gurley to Robert Woods to Jared Goff.
The basis of his offense is utilizing 11 personnel, pre-snap motion and play-action passes to deceive the defense. After all, common says having the same 11 players on the field for nearly every play makes it difficult to predict whether it’s a pass or run coming.
For two years, his scheme worked to perfection. This season has not been so kind to McVay with many suggesting he’s been exposed by opposing defenses. To an extent, that assessment isn’t necessarily wrong. But at the same time, the offensive line is decimated and Goff has regressed as a result.
But if there’s one thing McVay can control, it’s tendencies and tells. One in particular sticks out like a sore thumb when you watch the Rams play – and it’s probably something you’ve noticed yourself.
The Rams never run the ball out of shotgun formations.
According to Inside Edge, running backs have only gotten 12 carries out of the gun this year, picking up 45 yards on such plays. Both numbers are the lowest in the NFL by a wide margin. When the Rams go into shotgun formations, they throw the ball 96% of the time, according to Sharp Football Stats. Of course, that’s the widest differential in the league, with the next-closest team being the Buccaneers (91% pass).
When under center, the Rams are more balanced. They throw the ball 35% of the time (8th-highest) and run it 65% (25th). That’s why they’re able to run play-action fakes when the running back is lined up behind Goff, because there’s actually a threat to run the ball.
Out of the gun, the Rams don’t even bother trying with ball fakes. You almost never see Goff fake the handoff to Gurley when the two are lined up side by side. That’s because Gurley has only carried it eight times out of the shotgun for a measly 17 yards. Where’s the threat defenses have to account for?
Against the Steelers on Sunday afternoon, this tendency was on full display in the fourth quarter. On their last two drives, the Rams were in shotgun on every single play. Even with all three timeouts and nearly three minutes on the clock during their first drive, there was never a threat to run the ball by Los Angeles. No fake handoffs, no under-center plays, no play action. This tendency is so glaringly obvious that the Steelers almost certainly picked up on it coming into the game and knew that when the Rams were in shotgun, there was almost no chance they were going to run the ball.
As a result, they pinned their ears back and rushed Goff every time he was in the gun. This might seem obvious late in the game, and it is. Down five points, most teams are going to be airing the ball out. The Rams didn’t have to with three timeouts, but that’s the strategy they opted for.
This is the play just before the two-minute warning – a situation where running the ball is absolutely an option. Look how quickly the Steelers’ edge rushers get up the field, knowing there’s no chance the Rams are going to hand it off.
Clearly, gaining 3.8 yards per carry on rush attempts out of the gun doesn’t inspire much confidence. However, the fact that they’re not even trying to run it out of that formation is allowing defenses to know what’s coming. This wasn’t as big of a deal last season when teams were still trying to figure out McVay’s offense, but the Rams rarely ran it out of shotgun then, either.
They threw it 96% of the time out of the gun and ran it just 4% of the time. In 2017, the gap was closer: 87% run, 13% pass. With a full year of tape from last season to watch, and that tendency standing out so clearly, defenses have likely figured out what’s coming when Goff is in the gun – and McVay has yet to adjust.
It doesn’t help that the Rams have been in the shotgun more often this year than they were last year. In 2018, they used shotgun 38% of the time compared to 46% of the time this season. The more they use shotgun formations, the more predictable the offense gets.
Goff came from an Air Raid offense in college and lived in the shotgun at Cal. McVay has catered the offense to his skill set the last three years, giving him far more pass attempts out of the gun than under center since 2017. It also fits with what Gurley does best, running it from traditional singleback formations.
As bad as Gurley has been out of the gun in his career, the Rams do have a guy with a skill set that can have some success in those situations: Darrell Henderson. With Gurley seeing his workload limited, the Rams should take advantage of Henderson and hand him the ball out of the gun. At least that will keep the defense on its toes, rather than allowing edge rushers to pin their ears back and get after the QB.
Or what about a run-pass option (RPO)? The Eagles used that heavily on their march to the Super Bowl a few years ago. It’s an easy way to limit the effectiveness of a team’s pass rush, causing the defensive linemen to freeze for a second to read the play. Running RPOs with Goff and Henderson could be a nice wrinkle to the offense.
No matter what the solution is, McVay has to at least bring some unpredictability into the equation when the Rams line up in the gun. With no threat to run the ball, defenses are hardly ever fooled and pass rushers are teeing off on Goff. With a makeshift offensive line, that’s a disastrous combination.
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