(In this series, Touchdown Wire’s Mark Schofield takes a look at one important metric per NFL team to uncover a crucial problem to solve for the 2020 season. In this installment, it’s time to look at how the Los Angeles Rams and in particular Jared Goff struggled on play-action in 2019, and how Goff and Sean McVay might address that issue in 2020).
Two seasons ago the Los Angeles Rams rode a forward-thinking offense and a stout defense to Super Bowl LIII. Jared Goff seemed light-years removed from the potential draft bust he looked as a rookie and anyone who ever bumped into Sean McVay on the street was interviewed for a coaching job with another organization.
Their offense was one of the major reasons for their success in 2018. The Rams were second in the league in yards per game, averaging 421.1 yards in each of their contests. They were second in the league in points per game, averaging 32.9 per outing. In terms of Defense-adjusted Value Over Average, the Rams were also the second best offense in the league, with an Offensive DVOA of 24.6%, and a Weighted Offensive DVOA (which places an emphasis on recent performance) of 19.3%.
As you might expect, they trailed Patrick Mahomes and the Kansas City Chiefs in all of these categories.
How did the Rams and McVay build such a formidable offense? It began with their outside zone running game. The team relied heavily on 11 offensive personnel, which gave them a majority of nickel and sub packages to operate against, but then would run the ball against the lighter boxes that were created. In 2018 the Rams utilized 11 offensive personnel on 1,113 snaps – a whopping 89% of their plays – by far the most of any team in the league. But they ran the football on 447 of those plays, averaging 5.2 yards per carry and notching 25 rushing touchdowns.
Here is an example from that season of how 11 personnel gave the Rams lighter boxes to run against, and the favorable blocking angles that are created due to personnel and alignment:
From the end zone angle, watch as Todd Gurley is untouched until he is into the secondary:
What did all of this create? Favorable conditions for throwing off of play-action. McVay would often combine presnap motion with play-action elements, to get the defense moving before the play and give Goff some easy reads and throws. Like on this play:
Brandin Cooks comes in jet motion before the snap, and as this play begins Goff fakes a sweep to him, as well as a run to the left with Gurley. This is all eye candy for a Sail concept to the right side, with a deep corner route and an intermediate route from TE Tyler Higbee. Cooks continues to the right flat, giving Goff an outlet. But the QB doesn’t need to take that, as his tight end is open on the out route. Because of the motion and the eye candy, the linebackers are slow to get into their drops here. As Cooks releases to the flat, he pulls the cornerback down toward the line of scrimmage, expanding the throwing window for Goff to hit the out route.
Adding these elements together it should be no surprise that Goff was one of the league’s best performing passers when using play-action in 2018. According to charting data from Pro Football Focus, Goff saw an increase in Yards per Attempt of 2.5 yards when using play-action versus traditional dropback throws in 2018, which was fifth-best in the league. He also led the league with 15 touchdown passes on play-action throws. Goff was the only quarterback in the league to eclipse 2,000 yards passing when using play-action, and he had an NFL passer rating of 115.0 when using play-action, sixth-best in the league.
But there were warning signs for the Rams offense down the stretch in 2018, and even through the playoffs and into the Super Bowl. Starting with a late-season game against the Detroit Lions – the very game those clips are taken from – Matt Patricia perhaps laid the groundwork for stopping this defense. How? By ignoring the movement before the play and playing some simple zone coverage schemes in the secondary. The following week, Vic Fangio and the Chicago Bears copied this model, leading to plays like this:
Here, the Chicago Bears get a big stop on an outside zone running play by ignoring the motion. They simply slide their defenders, which gives them the ability to set the edge and stop this run in the backfield. Two plays later they would post a safety, enabling them to take over the game.
This schematic element would be copied by additional opponents of the Rams. The Philadelphia Eagles would employ it a week later in a huge win over the Rams, and as you might expect it was part of Bill Belichick’s game plan in Super Bowl LIII. In addition to using Cover 4 and calling two defensive plays in the huddle (and switching to the second one after the radio in Goff’s helmet was turned off) Belichick’s defense also ignored the motion.
By adding these elements together, teams seemed to have an answer for the Rams. This was something that defenses copied into the 2019 season. For example, watch this play from the Rams’ game against the Pittsburgh Steelers last year:
The Rams use pre-snap motion before this play but the Steelers simply ignore it, and when Los Angeles tries to run rookie Darrell Henderson to the right side on an outside zone running play, they managed a stop.
Without the ability to run with the effectiveness from a year ago, and with these new defensive tweaks to work against, the play-action game also suffered. Here it is on film:
The Rams use jet motion before the snap, and the Steelers’ defense simply ignores it, sliding rather than trailing the motion man. The Rams use play-action here, but the second level defenders do not bite on the fake and retreat into their underneath zones. Goff faces pressure in his face, and the throw is off target and intercepted.
What did this add up to for Goff in 2019? An NFL passer rating of just 85.9 when using play-action, which ranked him 23rd in the league, among 24 qualified passers (defined as those who attempted 50% of a team’s passes).
Furthermore, Goff had just four touchdown passes when using play-action, but threw five interceptions, tying him for second in the league.
So it is incumbent upon McVay and the offensive staff to get the play-action game going again, but how? It might start with a movement away from the outside zone game, which has been the foundation block of their offense, and a move towards more of a north/south game relying on designs such as duo, inside zone and some more gap/power concepts. In the second half of the season Goff’s numbers actually improved on play-action. He posted an NFL passer rating on play-action of 91.7 during Weeks 10-17, a big improvement from the 78.6 mark posted in Weeks 1-9. How bad was that 78.6? It placed him dead last in the league.
During the second half of the season, the Rams incorporated more of those above concepts into their running game.
You can also see a potential move towards these designs in their selection of Cam Akers in the second round, a running back from Florida State. Akers posted 904 yards after contact according to PFF charting data, placing him 12th in FBS in that category, a good trait for a north/south runner. He also did his best work between the tackles, and particularly between right guard and right tackle. PFF charted him with 221 yards and 6.7 Yards per Attempt on runs between the RG and RT, for four touchdowns. His best work anywhere along the offensive line.
By combining a more north/south approach as we saw last season and with the addition of Akers, the Rams can get back to some of their offensive success. Particularly with the play-action part of the game, which was such a huge piece of their success in 2018, and part of their downfall in 2019.