The Dolphins’ offensive coordinator change this offseason was a high profile move. Miami, which will enter 2021 with their third consecutive new coordinator(s) on offense in three years under Brian Flores, is hoping for even more success than the effort put forth in 2020. Despite the frustrations, Miami did average 25.2 points per game, their best in quite some time. But much of that scoring came on opportunistic turnovers and special teams play — and not enough thanks to explosive plays.
And so Miami will look to tinker with the foundation set in 2020. Where to start?
According to Sharp Football, the Dolphins ran 81% of their offensive snaps out of the shotgun as compared to 19% of their snaps from under center. They were 6th highest in the NFL last season in shotgun alignments and 16% above the league average. Miami, to their credit, passed the ball just 68% of the time out of the shotgun, a mark that was 30th in the league — so it wasn’t necessarily as if they tipped their hand by playing in the gun as frequently as they did. Their most steep split of the season was running the ball from under center, which they did 72% of the time in 2020, the 9th highest rate in football last year.
Why do these splits matter?
Trends. Situational football. Pre-snap keys. If a team sees Miami coming out of the huddle and into an under center alignment and knows Miami runs the ball more than 70% of the time out of the gun, they’ll be quick to adjust and flood gaps, making the run harder to live by. The numbers were consistent no matter how you split it. The ratio was the same in the first half as it was in the second half — so it isn’t as though Miami was getting their numbers skewed by late game 2-minute offense. The 1st- and 2nd-down numbers were proportionate as compared to third down as well.
Miami’s backfield alignment was heavily skewed into a shotgun alignment and the team did their best to not tip their hand to run/pass tendencies based on the alignment, although some of that could also be credited to Miami’s high-frequency of RPOs.
- Miami Dolphins (81% shotgun, 25.2 ppg): 32% run, 68% pass
But how does that compare to the cream of the crop? Take a look at the shotgun run/pass ratios for the top scoring offenses in football last year:
- Green Bay Packers (59% shotgun, 31.8 ppg): 22% run, 78% pass
- Buffalo Bills (59% shotgun, 31.2 ppg): 20% run, 80% pass
- Tampa Bay Buccaneers (51% shotgun, 30.8 ppg): 9% run, 91% pass
- Tennessee Titans (45% shotgun, 30.7 ppg): 20% run, 80% pass
- New Orleans Saints (52% shotgun, 30.1 ppg): 13% run, 87% pass
Interestingly enough, the run/pass splits out of the gun for the top-5 scoring offenses in football were quite heavy. All of these teams, which are the only 5 in football to average more than 30 points per game last season, had much greater discrepancies between their run and pass rate out of the shotgun last year. But one area that stands out a major divider for all five versus Miami?
The balance of the backfield in pre-snap.
Miami’s 81% shotgun rate was at least 20% higher than the five most potent offenses in football last season. Balance matters. To be so high-volume out of the shotgun certainly didn’t help Miami’s ability to succeed in the run game with consistency, especially since Miami didn’t implement a great deal of pistol alignments, which would allow the running back to attack either side of the line of scrimmage with quickness and momentum downhill.
Which brings about yet another question: why were the Dolphins so deeply skewed to the shotgun? That comes back to a talking point from earlier in the season: Tua Tagovailoa’s experiences at Alabama, his comfort with the Dolphins’ 2020 playbook and his ability to execute only portions of the concepts within it.
Weeks 1 through 6 and Week 12, which were games started by veteran quarterback Ryan Fitzpatrick, saw Miami implement shotgun at a 74% rate — still notably high and certainly still in need of added balance relative to the top scoring offenses and their more balanced formations. But Weeks 7 through 17 (sans Week 12, which Tagovailoa missed with a throwing hand injury)? The Dolphins ran out of the shotgun at an 85% clip — only the Baltimore Ravens, Pittsburgh Steelers and Arizona Cardinals ran out of the shotgun more over those same weeks of play. Such tendencies can work in Arizona and Baltimore, where quarterbacks that run in the 4.3s in the 40-yard dash give you a horizontal stress to opposing run defenses and can add an extra gap in the run game by optioning off the end man on the line of scrimmage.
That didn’t work out so well for Pittsburgh, though — as they finished dead last in the NFL in rushing offense (84.4 yards per game, 1351 total rushing yards). And Miami’s frustrating inconsistencies in the run game last year were well documented, too.
This suggests that Miami was, as suspected, working with just a portion of the playbook with Tagovailoa in the game — one that hindered Miami’s ability to stay balanced with their alignments. So as Miami makes a bid to improve their offensive balance and their proficiency in the run game, this is one place to start:
Make sure Tua Tagovailoa is not only “more comfortable” under center but rather “fully comfortable” under center and get him there with more frequency in 2021 to present a more balanced picture to opposing defenses.