The Case for Dobbins
Now, let’s examine the case for picking Dobbins in the second round. As with many counter-arguments to data driven position, the case here begins with one word: “context.” In support of picking a running back in the second round, proponents of the selection argue that the Baltimore Ravens are a team that places a huge emphasis on the ground game, and as such, a running back selection makes good sense.
Putting the relative importance of the running game vis-a-vis the passing game to the side for a moment, let’s dive a bit deeper into the 2019 Ravens. Specifically, personnel usage. An argument in favor of addressing a different position – say, wide receiver – can also be made on personnel package grounds. Most teams rely on 11 personnel, with three wide receivers on the field. Given that, and the relative terms of what a wide receiver could bring in EPA/P versus a running back, even a third wide receiver might be more valuable than a top running back. After all, teams used 11 offensive personnel on 55% of snaps league-wide a year ago.
But there are often exceptions to every rule, and the 2019 Ravens are one such exception. They used 11 offensive personnel on just 44% of their offensive snaps a year ago, and only six teams used that package less as a percentage of their offensive plays. First up, the Arizona Cardinals, who used 11 offensive personnel just 37% of the time. The Cardinals by contract used 10 offensive personnel, with four wide receivers, 26% of the time, far and a way the league leaders in that personnel grouping. The Denver Broncos were one of those six teams, who used 11 offensive personnel 43% of the time. The Minnesota Vikings used 11 personnel a league-fewest 18% of the time, as they were a heavy 21/12 personnel team, similar to the San Francisco 49ers, who used 11 personnel 30% of the time but relied on both 12/21 personnel. The Philadelphia Eagles used 11 personnel just 38% of the time, as opposed to their 54% usage of 12 personnel. Finally there were the Titans, who used 11 personnel on 41% of their offensive snaps.
The Ravens, outside of 11 personnel, use 12 offensive personnel (two tight ends, two running backs) on 17% of their offensive plays. They used 21 offensive personnel (two running backs, two wide receivers, one tight end) on 12% of their plays. Finally, they used 22 personnel (two running backs, two tight ends and just one wide receiver) on 16% of their passing plays. That was a league-high, and it accounted for 148 of their total plays. In fact, when you combine 21 and 22 personnel, that accounts for 258 offensive plays, or 38% of their offense. 38% of the time they had two running backs on the field. Then add in 12 personnel or another 161 plays. That gets you to 45% of their offense. If you really want to get crazy, the Ravens used 13 offensive personnel – three tight ends – on 7% of their plays. Meaning that on the majority of their offensive plays, they had two or fewer wide receivers on the field.
So if they did draft a wide receiver in the second round, and added that player to their crop of WRs, that player might not see the field as much as a player at running back or tight end does. Especially when you consider that a season ago the Ravens drafted two receivers in the first three rounds of the draft: Marquise “Hollywood” Brown, their first-round pick, and Myles Boykin, their third-round selection.
Furthermore, it is clear that the Ravens did have a “type” this season when drafting wide receivers, as they ended up doubling down on the position after the Dobbins pick. In the third round they drafted Devin Duvernay, a wide receiver from Texas. Then on the third day of the draft they added SMU wide receiver James Proche. What do these two wideouts have in common? They are both slot receivers. Duvernay was described in the Pro Football Focus Draft Guide as “one of the top slot receivers in the class,” and his 104 receptions from the slot a year ago were second in college football. Proche is viewed in a similar manner. PFF described him as a player “…tailor-made to play slot in NFL. Quickness and route running are pluses.” PFF went on to say that Proche is “[d]eadly with a two-way go. Perfected hesitation move to freeze defenders on in/out routes.”
That leads us to a potential discussion of slot receivers. Because they have that two-way go opportunity, the job is a bit easier for them. Without the sideline near them (and the corresponding ability of the defensive back to potentially pin them along the boundary) slot receivers with that two-way go opportunity have it easier when it comes to getting off the line of scrimmage and into their route. As such, receivers with a proven ability to beat coverage on the outside are more highly coveted, while slot receivers fall in the draft.
So here we have the Ravens, a team that relies on three receiver looks less than the majority of the teams in the league, a team that drafted two receivers early last year, and a team that looked to maximize value in slot receivers later in the draft after picking a running back in the second round. Perhaps they did account for positional value after all. Perhaps their view of the situation was: “We rely on running backs and tight ends more in our offense than we do wide receivers. We drafted two wide receivers early last year, and if we want to use more 11 personnel in the season ahead we really need a slot type, but since we can get those guys a bit later in the draft because of how they are valued, we can go with a different position here in the second.”
But even still, as we just saw, there is a case to be made that if they wanted to help the ground game, offensive line is perhaps a more valuable asset. With the Yanda retirement, perhaps a more effective use of draft capital. After all, you already have Mark Ingram, right?
Looking at that argument, an offshoot of the – again, incredibly oversimplified – “running backs don’t matter” argument is that you should not give running backs big money deals, because the return on the investment is never worth the expenditure. In draft capital terms, you can wait on these players and get running backs to contribute in the later rounds. This year alone players like Antonio Gibson, Zack Moss, Joshua Kelly and Anthony McFarland Jr. came off the board after Dobbins. In salary cap terms, spending money on these guys is a poor financial choice.
When the Ravens signed Mark Ingram last year in free agency, they signed him to a three-year, $15 million dollar deal. For the 2020 season, he is due a base salary of $4 million with a $1.3 million signing bonus. In 2021? Ingram has a base salary of $5 million. But if the team were to move on from him prior to next year, he would account for a dead cap number of $1.3 million.
Dobbins’ second-round contract? According to OverTheCap.com that will com with a base salary of $610,000 in 2020.
If the idea here is to move on from Ingram prior to 2021 with a cost-controlled running back in Dobbins, that might be a wise expenditure of cap resources after all. Now, if they end up giving Ingram a big money deal – and then doing the same with Dobbins a few years later – that would be ripe for criticism. But right now it does not seem like the Ravens are going to go down that road.
So ultimately, the case for Dobbins might also be a positional value one, in a sense. While the majority of teams may value a third wide receiver at that spot in the draft, the Ravens rely more on running backs and tight ends in terms of position groupings, and if they are going to implement more 11 personnel in 2020, they needed more of a slot receiver. A position that, in terms of positional value, is not coveted as highly, allowing them to double-dip at that position later in the draft with two guys viewed as among the best the draft had to offer. So sure, for the bulk of NFL teams a guy who might be WR3 is more valuable than RB2 or even RB1B, but in Baltimore, the rules are different.
The Verdict
Look, I was a bad lawyer. My attempts here at carving out arguments on both sides of this debate probably brings that point home. So it stands that I would make an even worse judge, but here we are…
There are compelling points on both sides of this debate. In the end, the “verdict” might read something like this: “In a vacuum, the positional value of a running back in the second round is largely outweighed by the positional value of another position, particularly one like wide receiver, that can help you in the passing game. Years of evidence points to the fact that the passing game is critical to scoring points, which is after all the goal of any offense, and even the most successful ground games still are outperformed on an EPA/P basis by average passing games. The 2019 Tennessee Titans are a testament to that idea. Even if you want to help the ground game, perhaps a position along the offensive line is a wiser use of draft capital at that spot, because we have seen that running back success is often due more to the offensive line play in front of them. Oh, and an offensive lineman can help protect your quarterback too.
However, in this limited case, the Baltimore Ravens might serve as an exception to that general rule of positional value. Unlike most teams, the Ravens rely more on two- or even one-WR packages, so adding a receiver at that spot – a year after drafting two receivers early – might not be the best use of draft capital. If indeed the Ravens are going to use more 11 personnel in the year ahead, their true need was a guy to play in the slot, a position where you can find options later in the draft. Which is what they did, in picking Duvernay and Proche later on Day Two and even later on Day Three. Ultimately, what the Ravens did was select a player who can be a cost-controlled option in their running game, allowing them to move on from Ingram prior to next year, preventing them from paying a running back a base salary of $5 million.”
But that doesn’t fit on a bumper sticker. Or in a tweet.