Things are certainly different in the world as Memorial Day approaches.
In the football world, the summer is a perfect time for self-improvement. Players work at their craft, like Tom Brady, who recently got his new teammates together for a throwing session. For those of us in the media world, summer is a perfect time to work at our craft as well.
What might that entail? Rather than rushing into scouting the next draft class – although those days are coming – the summer is a great time to look back at the previous NFL season. To pick up on things that you might have missed in the frenetic pace of the regular season.
In addition, looking backward prepares you to look forward with a better frame of reference for what works in the NFL, and what does not.
Before I dive into the next class of prospects, I’m taking some time to see what works for some players who were in previous classes.
That has me watching San Francisco 49ers quarterback Jimmy Garoppolo, the first player on my personal summer watch list. As I work through studying him things catch my eye that, for one reason or another, I never wrote about in the fall, and so now is a perfect time to revisit some thoughts that were never shared.
We know that the NFL is a copycat league, and that many organizations are trying to replicate what successful teams have done in previous seasons. One of the current flavors of the moment has teams trying to coach up young quarterbacks on their rookie deals. Think, for example, of Sean McVay on the helmet radio before each snap, instructing Jared Goff.
Now helping your quarterback is not exactly a new phenomenon, and it is not something that you stop trying to do once your passer reaches a certain age. Josh McDaniels had the benefit of coaching arguably the greatest quarterback of all time the past few seasons, but he went a long way to try and help Tom Brady on every single play. Whether by motion, movement or design, McDaniels did everything he could to give his quarterback as much information as possible before each play.
Kyle Shanahan has taken a similar approach with Garoppolo.
Shanahan is a master at using personnel to his advantage, often throwing out of bigger player packages such as 21 or 12 personnel. That allows the 49ers to throw against base defensive looks. But in addition, Shanahan uses movement before the play as well as alignment and formations to give his quarterback as much information as possible before the snap. The more information any quarterback has before the ball is in his hands, the better his decisions are going to be once he has the football.
Here is what that looks like.
We can start our analysis all the way back in Week 1 of the 2019 NFL season. Remember September? It was a simpler time after all, with the ability to go outside and all. But Shanahan displayed early on his penchant for giving Garoppolo information before the snap, making his decision-making process that much easier. The 49ers face a 1st and 10 on their own 21-yard line midway through the first quarter. They come out using 21 offensive personnel (two running backs, two wide receivers and one tight end) and align in a weak I left formation, with tight end George Kittle flexed outside of the receiver:
Before diving into the mechanics of the play, take a moment to look at the Tampa Bay Buccaneers defense. In response to the 21 personnel package, they keep their base defensive unit on the field, with three down linemen, four linebackers and four defensive backs. Against this kind of package, Shanahan wants to be throwing the football.
Prior to the snap, Kittle comes in YAC (Y across the formation) motion, moving from his alignment on the left side of the formation to a wing position on the right. Watch what the defense does in response:
Safety Jordan Whitehead trails the tight end across the formation.
Now put yourself in Garoppolo’s shoes, or helmet if you prefer. He knows the Buccaneers are in their base defense. He also knows that they are in some sort of man coverage, given Whitehead following Kittle across the football. He has more information available to him now than he did when the teams broke their respective huddles.
Here is what the 49ers run on the play:
Kittle runs a deep curl route, while both running backs release to the outside. Fullback Kyle Juszczyk runs a wheel route while Tevin Coleman runs a swing route. The action of the running backs will pull the linebackers to the outside, because as Garoppolo knows, the defense is in man coverage. What will that do? Create traffic underneath that Marquise Goodwin can exploit on his simple shallow route:
That is exactly what happens. Devin White, the rookie linebacker from LSU, races to the outside to try and stay with Coleman. As he does so, he nearly picks off cornerback Carlton Davis, who is trying to stick on Goodwin’s crossing route. The angle of the receivers’ route plus the traffic created underneath gives Goodwin all the space he needs. Armed with all the information available to him before the play, Garoppolo makes a quick decision and turns and easy throw on 1st and 10 into a very manageable 2nd and 3.
Here is another example from San Francisco’s season-opening win over the Buccaneers. This time the quarterback gets all the information he needs before the play thanks to alignment and personnel, without the need for presnap movement. The 49ers align for this 1st and 10 play late in the second quarter with Garoppolo alone in the backfield in a shotgun alignment. San Francisco has 11 offensive personnel on the field (one tight end, one running back and three wide receivers) but they align running back Matt Bredia to the boundary, along the right sideline. Wide receiver Dante Pettis is inside of him in the slot:
Now look at the defense. Personnel-wise, the Buccaneers are in their base 3-4 look, but with linebacker Deone Bucannon in the game, who is more of a hybrid linebacker/safety. More critical to the analysis is the player across from Bredia, and that defender’s presnap alignment.
Tampa Bay has Davis, the cornerback, across from the running back. Now either they are using a coverage CB on a running back – and not one of the three wide receivers on the field – or they are in some sort of zone coverage. Furthermore, look where Davis is aligned: Nearly ten yards off the football. Now scan the rest of the secondary. This is a Cover 4 look, right? With nearly every defensive back about ten yards off the football.
Here is what the 49ers are running on the play:
To the Pettis/Bredia side of the field they are running a go/flat combination, sometimes called Ohio. (You Madden players will recognize that playcall). Garoppolo will check the vertical route first and give it a “peek.” Meaning that if he can steal a cheap play downfield he will take that deep throw, but if that route is covered his eyes will come to the flat route from the inside receiver.
Given where Davis is, and the knowledge that the Buccaneers are likely in Cover 4, Garoppolo can feel pretty confident in throwing the flat route. Especially the alignment of the nearest defender, the outside linebacker who is playing with inside leverage in relation to Pettis. But there is one more fear: Some sort of trap coverage.
In response to the prevalence of this route concept in both pro and college football, defenses are often using the cornerback to “trap” the flat route. The CB will read through the inside receiver to the quarterback, and if the cornerback sees the inside receiver break quickly to the flat – as Pettis will do on this play – the cornerback will pass off the vertical route to the safety and break (trap) the flat route, hopefully jumping it for an interception.
Garoppolo, however, does not need to worry about that. Why? Because of the presnap alignment from Davis. Given his depth downfield, there is no way he can trap the flat route from Pettis. So when the ball is snapped he comes immediately to the slot route, confirms that Davis has not done anything unexpected, and takes the easy throw:
This time, just the personnel leads Garoppolo to all the information he needs to make a quick, and correct, decision after the snap.
In Week 2 against the Cincinnati Bengals Shanahan continued this trend of informing his quarterback before the snap. On this 2nd and 10 play, the 49ers align with 11 offensive personnel and have Garoppolo in the shotgun, with two receivers in a stack slot look to the left. The Bengals counter with their sub 4-2-5 package:
Just prior to the snap, the 49ers bring Pettis in jet motion from his starting point on the left side of the formation towards the football. In response, the Bengals simply slide their second-level defenders:
It happens in an instant, but Garoppolo can see linebacker Preston Brown and cornerback Darius Phillips pointing out the motion, rather than Phillips trailing Pettis across the formation. What does that tell him? Zone coverage.
Here is what the 49ers run on the play:
This is essentially a two-receiver route. The receiver on the left side runs a dig route, breaking to the inside. The receiver on the right runs what Shanahan calls a “swirl” route, where he shows a corner route breaking to the outside at 10 yards, but when he hits about 15 yards downfield he will stop and curl towards the QB. So Garoppolo knows the Bengals are in some sort of zone coverage, likey Cover 3 given the alignment of the outside CBs, but now if he wants to throw the dig he knows that there is another potential pitfall lurking: The “robot.”
No, the Bengals’ defenders are not going to break out into some robotic type of dance to try and distract him. Robot is a Nick Saban term for the linebackers in his Cover 3 schemes, calling for them to get depth and rob underneath. Basically, linebackers are going to drop and try and break under routes breaking to the middle of the field.
Like, for example, dig routes.
So as you watch Garoppolo here you can put yourself into his mindset. He knows that the Bengals are in zone coverage thanks to the presnap movement. He can be pretty sure they are in Cover 3, thanks to the alignment of the outside cornerbacks. But if he wants to throw the dig, he needs to be wary of the robot call. Watch as he scans the field, looks at the dig route, then checks the linebacker to see what he is doing, and when he sees Nick Vigil (#59) try and get under the dig, he works back to the swirl route:
“Processing speed” is a term you often hear during draft season. It is a scouting term to study that reflects how quickly a player can evaluate what is happening in front of him and react to the external stimulus and make the right decision on the field. This is a critical component to playing the quarterback position. If a QB is slow to decipher a defense and/or makes the wrong decisions when the defense rotates its coverage, he is going to struggle.
On this play, we see excellent processing speed from Garoppolo, illustrated by him looking for Vigil trying to rob that dig route and then working back to the swirl route. But remember, he is able to do that quickly because of the information given to him prior to the play thanks to Shanahan’s design.
Now, even with all the possible information available to a quarterback before the snap, mistakes are still made. Remember, the guys on the other side of the football are getting paid too. Returning to the Week 1 meeting between the 49ers and the Buccaneers we can see an example of things going wrong for the QB.
On this 2nd and 18 play the 49ers use 11 offensive personnel, and the Buccaneers counter with their 4-2-5 nickel package. Coleman, the running back, begins the play in the backfield next to the QB but then shifts to the outside, aligning as the boundary receiver in a trips formation to the left:
Did you catch what the defense did in response? Instead of a linebacker trailing Coleman, cornerback Vernon Hargreaves simply slides outside to align across from Coleman. Using your context clues, what does this tell you – and more importantly Garoppolo – about the defense?
That’s right. The quarterback can expect some kind of zone coverage. You’re paying attention.
Okay home-schooling the kids is getting to me…
Back to the play. The 49ers run a popular route concept at both the pro and college levels: Stab. This is a variation of the smash concept (some might term this smash-fade) where the outside receiver runs a hitch and the inside receiver (in this case the middle receiver since the 49ers are in a trips) runs a fade route from the slot. Kittle, the inner-most receiver, runs a stick route:
The read here for the quarterback is pretty simple. In fact, it is simple enough that I ran it in college, and remember, I was the worst quarterback in all of college football from 1996-1999. Seriously. But this is a high-low concept where the fade and the hitch are going to bracket the outside defender, in this case Hargreaves. If the CB collapses on the hitch, you throw the fade over his head. If he gets depth under the fade, you throw the hitch. (This high-low read concept is why some call this route smash-fade, since it mirrors the read concept on smash, which is a combination of a hitch route and a corner route).
Garoppolo, given the alignment presnap of Hargreaves and the rest of the defense, expects the Buccaneers to be in some variation of Cover 3. The corners are playing off their receivers and there is a single safety in the middle of the field. Given this, the QB expects that Hargreaves will sink under the fade route when this play begins.
So he looks to the hitch from Coleman.
The problem? Hargreaves does a tremendous job of reading the QB’s eyes while staying patient. Garoppolo tries to make this throw with anticipation, believing in his read of the play and his arm strength. He pulls the trigger on the hitch quickly. The problem? Hargreaves is staring right at him, and because Garoppolo gets the ball out so fast, it comes out before the CB has to even choose which route to cover. Look at the state of play when Garoppolo releases this pass:
The ball is coming out, and the fade route receiver is still near the line of scrimmage. Hargreaves has not been put into a bind yet, so he can stay patient and read the quarterback. If Garoppolo bides his time he will force Hargreaves to declare his intentions. But Garoppolo, believing this is Cover 3, assumes that the CB will bail deep and wants to get this out before the curl/flat defender races to the outside to cover the hitch route. The result:
Six points the other way.
So even armed with the information, Garoppolo still gets burned.
That doesn’t mean that Shanahan is going to stop giving him information in an effort to avoid overloading his QB before the play. In fact, he will go right back to it. This is the very next route concept the 49ers throw to start their next possession:
The 49ers bring out 21 offensive personnel and then empty the formation. Before the snap, Garoppolo can be sure they are in man coverage, given how the defense adjusts to the personnel and the shift into empty from the offense. The 49ers then run the mesh concept – a perfect route to attack man coverage – and in the ensuing traffic that is created underneath bodies go flying and Garoppolo is able to hit Coleman on a simple crosser that the RB turnes into a 31 yard gain. The flag? That is for illegal use of hands on the defense, which is declined.
Again, armed with additional information presnap thanks to the personnel and movement, Garoppolo makes a quick – informed – decision, and it goes for a huge gain.
Helping your quarterback is the job of any offensive coordinator, playcaller, or head coach. Sure it can start with personnel, you can use radio helmets, or you can assist that player in other ways. Like McDaniels, Shanahan looks to help his signal-caller before the ball is put into play. It got the 49ers to the Super Bowl last season. Can it get them over the hump in the next?